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Abstract
Decision makers in dynamic environments such as air traffic control, firefighting, and call center operations adapt
in real-time using outcome feedback. Understanding this adaptation is important for influencing and improving
the decisions made. Recently, stimulus-response (S-R) learning models have been proposed as explanations for
decision makers’ adaptation. S-R models hypothesize that decision makers choose an action option based on their
anticipation of its success. Decision makers learn by accumulating evidence over action options and combining
that evidence with prior expectations. This study examines a standard S-R model and a simple variation of this
model, in which past experience may receive an extremely low weight, as explanations for decision makers’
adaptation in an evolving Internet-based bargaining environment. In Experiment 1, decision makers are taught to
predict behavior in a bargaining task that follows rules that may be the opposite of, congruent to, or unrelated to a
second task in which they must choose the deal terms they will offer. Both models provide a good account of the
prediction task. However, only the second model, in which decision makers heavily discount all but the most recent
past experience, provides a good account of subsequent behavior in the second task. To test whether Experiment
1 artificially related choice behavior and prediction, a second experiment examines both models’ predictions
concerning the effects of bargaining experience on subsequent prediction. In this study, decision models where
long-term experience plays a dominating role do not appear to provide adequate explanations of decision makers’
adaptation to their opponent’s changing response behavior.
Keywords: dynamic decision making, game theory, stimuls-response, reinforcement learning
Decision makers in dynamic environments use feedback from their previous decisions to
adapt to an evolving situation under time pressure. For instance, experienced fire chiefs
continuously adapt their attempts to control a fire as results from previous attempts reveal
more about it (Klein et al., 1993). Air traffic controllers and police dispatchers monitor the
results of previous allocation decisions to determine how they might alter their course of
action (Joslyn and Hunt, 1998; Kanfer and Ackerman, 1989). During calls to delinquent
debtors, telephone-based credit collectors weigh responses to their offers in adjusting their
next offer up or down (Gibson and Fichman, 1998; Sutton, 1991). Understanding how
decision makers adapt using feedback is important because it provides a lever for influencing
and improving their decision making.
Brehmer and others have suggested that an important determinant of decision makers’
ability to adapt from feedback is the internal causal model they develop of the task (Brehmer,
1990, 1992, 1995; Dienes and Fahey, 1995; Gibson et al., 1997; Gibson, 2000; Kleinmuntz,
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1993; Sterman, 1994). This observation suggests that more experienced decision makers
with better developed models of how causes lead to events should perform better in evolving
environments, and they do (Klein et al., 1993). It also suggests that a way to improve decision
makers’ performance is to improve their causal model of the environment. However, rapid
adaptation to feedback is not limited to experienced decision makers, and it appears not
to require in-depth knowledge about the causal structure of the task. Paich and Sterman
(1993) observe that decision makers in a complex market task adapt their decisions so as to
pursue more successful strategies although their level of performance does not appear to be
based on a sophisticated understanding of cause and effect in the task. Gibson et al. (1997)
similarly observe that decision makers use feedback about previous decision outcomes to
adapt their decisions to changed context in a production management task, even though the
decision makers do not display a systematic understanding of causal factors within the task
environment.
Recently, several authors have proposed stimulus-response (S-R) learning to provide an
account of how decision makers rapidly form simple internal models that associate actions
with rewards without necessarily taking into account causation (Dienes and Fahey, 1995;
Erev and Roth, 1998; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Roth and Erev, 1995). A frequent base
assumption in these models is that the decision maker is in a stable environment that does
not alter over time (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998, p. 31). However, dynamic environments
do not display stable response tendencies thereby leading to the question of whether these
models can account for behavior in dynamic environments.1
This study examines base (long-memory) S-R models and a simple variation of these
models (short-memory), in which past experience is rapidly forgotten, as explanations for
decision makers’ adaptation in an evolving Internet-based ultimatum bargaining task. The
next section reviews the psychological assumptions and mechanics of S-R models as applied
to dynamic tasks. In Experiment 1, both long-memory and short-memory models are used
to provide accounts of decision makers’ behavior when they are taught to predict their
opponents’ responses in a bargaining task. This task follows rules that may be the opposite
of, congruent to, or unrelated to a second task in which decision makers must choose the
deal terms they will offer. Both models provide a good account of the prediction task, but
only the short-memory model begins to account for subsequent behavior in the bargaining
task. To determine how dependent the effects observed in Experiment 1 are on the prediction
training corpus used in that experiment, Experiment 2 examines the effects of bargaining
experience with opponents using different response rules on decision makers’ subsequent
predictions of their opponents reactions. Decision models where long-term experience plays
a dominating role in determining behavior do not appear to provide an adequate explanation
of behavior in the very simple environment examined in this study.
S-R Learning and Dynamic Tasks
S-R learning encompasses a broad class of models that are currently being investigated in
repeated decision making (Dienes and Fahey, 1995; Erev and Roth, 1998; Fudenberg and
Levine, 1998; Rapoport et al., 1997; Roth and Erev, 1995), skill automatization (Logan,
1988, 1990, 1992), binary categorization (Erev, 1998), and animal learning (Barto et al.,
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1989). As accounts of decision making, S-R models assume that decision makers represent
choices as a set of discrete options, ai , one per possible action, for which evidence accu-
mulates in the course of learning. For instance, the action options for a bargainer who can
make high, medium, or low bids are just high, medium, and low. At any point in time when
called upon to take action, the decision maker chooses an action based on the weight, wi ,
of evidence that has accumulated for that action relative to other actions given by:
Evidence(ai ) = wi∑k
j=1 w j
(1)
where k is the total number of available action options, three in the case of the example.
Equation (1) might be thought of as giving the decision maker’s anticipation of success
using action ai relative to other available options. For instance, if the bargainer has had
success with low bids nine times and medium or high bids one time each, the weight of
evidence for the low bid is nine-elevenths. The decision maker is assumed to use this expec-
tation or judgment to make a choice by either choosing the action with highest expectation
(Fudenberg and Levine, 1998, best response) or, as assumed in this study, choosing stochas-
tically with the probability of each action given by the relative weight of evidence in its favor
(Erev and Roth, 1998). In the first case, the decision maker only makes the offer with the
highest expectation of success, and, in the latter, the decision maker engages in probability
matching, a frequently noted pattern in choice under uncertainty (e.g., Erev et al., 1999).
An important feature of this decision rule is that it is essentially associative. Options
are chosen based on their associations with past successes, not based on a theory the
decision maker may possess of how his or her actions cause outcomes. There is much
evidence from more complex environments compatible with the assumption that developing
an explicit theory of cause and effect in the environment is not a prerequisite for performance
improvement. Sterman (1989) observes that decision makers improve with versions of
his stock management task but are not able to immediately transfer these performance
improvements when some of the parameters of the task change. Brehmer (1995) makes
similar observations for subjects playing the role of firefighters. Finally, Stanley et al.
(1989) observe that only 15% of decision makers were able to state a rule that properly took
into account causality as they learned to manage a simulated factory, although performance
improvement across decision makers was statistically significant. More significantly, in
this study, decision makers who were able to state a useful causal model did so only after
showing significant performance improvement.
Evidence for each decision option accumulates based on the perceived reward, rt ,
that would have been received at time t as a result of taking action ai or of predicting that ai
would succeed (for an elaboration of this predictive view, see Barto et al., 1989; Sutton,
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where k − 1 is the total number of decision options less the selected option. Note from the
equation that the decision maker increases the weight of unchosen alternatives if the chosen
option fails. This assumption is quite common in modeling decision behavior (Fudenberg
and Levine, 1998, pp. 120–121).2
There are different possible interpretations of rt that involve assumptions about how
decision makers perceive rewards. The work in this study uses two assumptions for rt .
The long-memory model assumes that decision makers’ perception of rt is equal to a fixed
fraction, α1, of the decision maker’s initial expectations as measured at the beginning of
the experiment (i.e., rt = α1
∑k
j=1 w j,t=0). This same core assumption has been adopted
by Erev and his collaborators as a point of departure in using S-R models to account for
how decision makers learn in games (e.g., Erev et al., 1999; Erev and Roth, 1998; Roth
and Erev, 1995) and also underlies a number of related learning theories (Fudenberg and
Levine, 1998. p. 31).
Note that the constant learning rate in Eq. (2) assumes that decision makers already give
strong weight to their initial expectations at the start of learning. As learning progresses using
Eq. (2), the ability of new evidence to alter decision maker behavior decreases to the point
where it becomes infinitesimally small, and decision makers cease adapting (Fudenberg and
Levine, 1998). This feature of the model runs counter to evidence from dynamic tasks where
decision makers are able to more rapidly adjust their behavior to changed environmental
circumstances. For instance, Gibson et al. (1997) present evidence that decision makers
experience an initial performance deficit when asked to manage a simulated factory to a
new production goal but rapidly adapt.
The short-memory model is an alternative that allows decision makers to adapt. The
short-memory model assumes that decision makers’ perception of rt is equal to a fixed
fraction, α2, of the decision maker’s prior expectations as accumulated in the task up to
the point of the particular decision (i.e., rt = α2
∑k
j=1 w j,t ). Thus, the key differentiating
feature of this model is that decision makers continuously discount prior experience in
light of new evidence, also an assumption in previous adjustments to S-R learning where
a “forgetting” parameter is included to improve fit in stable environments (Erev and Roth,
1998; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Roth and Erev, 1995). With sufficient experience,
adaptive decision makers forget the past.
As described, a clear implication of S-R learning is that teaching decision makers to
predict rewards should influence their subsequent selection of action options in predictable
ways. As indicated by the construction of the short-memory and long-memory models, the
strength and duration of any experimentally induced bias should depend on the weight the
decision maker places on past evidence. These issues are examined in detail in Experiments 1
and 2 below.
Experiment 1: Prediction and Bargaining
This experiment used a fast-paced bargaining task, the Collections task, to test both short-
memory and long-memory accounts of S-R learning as explanations of decision makers’
behavior when they learn to predict an opponent’s responses to their offers and then must
actually bargain.
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Figure 1. Bargaining screen.
Task
The Collections task, shown in figure 1, is a repeated bargaining game between debtors
and collectors in which collectors make offers to debtors, and debtors respond by either
accepting or rejecting. Subjects play the role of the credit collectors. As shown in figure 1,
during each contact, the subject makes an offer to the debtor within a time limit of four
seconds.3 Subjects’ goal is to get the debtor to agree to as high a payment in as few days
as possible. To make their offers, subjects click on a dollar amount (between $100 and
$500), a number of days (between one and ten) in which the dollar amount must be paid,
and an education statement (positive:4 “Pay, it will get you back on track!”; negative: “Pay,
otherwise legal action may be taken!”).5 Once subjects have completed their selections, they
click on the button labeled Talk. A male voice responds only with the statements “Accept”
or “Reject”.
The collections task is hosted on the Internet, and subjects are told that they are bargaining
with debtors on the other side of a movable wall that divides the room where the experiment
takes place. Subjects are also instructed that, if debtors do not accept their offers, they should
compromise by offering to wait more days for payment, accepting smaller payments, or
some combination of the two. Subjects are further instructed that they should try the different
education statements and determine for themselves which are more effective.
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In reality, the debtor’s responses are based on whether the subject (collector) has chosen
the appropriate education statement as follows:
Response =
{
Accept with 85% probability, Bargainer Education = Accept type
Reject with 85% probability, Bargainer Education = Accept type
(3)
where Bargainer Education is the education statement selected by the subject (collector)
and Accept type is the type of education that the debtor responds to. Responses are prob-
ablistic to add uncertainty to the task with 85% chosen to provide a high enough level of
validity that subjects will not have too much trouble discerning it in the time allotted for the
experiments (Naylor and Clark, 1968). No other considerations, such as the days or dollars
components of the offers, enter into the debtor’s decision to accept. While this structure is
very simple, it corresponds to decision makers’ intuitive representation of targets as requir-
ing harder and softer approaches in such functioning environments as credit collection call
centers and police interrogation centers (Rafaeli and Sutton, 1991; Sutton, 1991).
Method
Forty-eight University of Michigan undergraduate business students participated in the
study for $10 pay. As detailed in Table 1, subjects sequentially completed four activities in
the experiment: initial expectations, prediction training, bargaining, and factual questions.
The experimental manipulation occurred in the second activity, prediction training, where
subjects were randomly assigned in equal groups to predict the responses of debtors using
control, negative, or positive response rules.
The first activity, initial expectations, obtained baseline data on subjects’ beliefs
concerning the effectiveness of positive and negative education prior to the experimen-
tal manipulation. In prediction training, debtors using the positive response rule accepted
only after positive education, those using the negative response rule only after negative
education, and those using the control response rule accepted according to each of these
rules one-half the time. In the bargaining task, subjects made their own offers consisting
of dollars, days, and education. In this task, all debtors responded favorably to positive
education based on Eq. (3). After bargaining, in the factual questions, subjects indicated
what they considered to be the single most important element in determining whether the
debtor would accept or reject their offer.
Reinforcement Learning Model Assumptions. The implementation of the short-memory
and long-memory models made two important psychological assumptions about decision
maker behavior beyond those already addressed. The first concerned how decision mak-
ers represented the offers as they learned in the task. The simulations in this experiment
assumed that evidence was accumulated for each offer component separately and inde-
pendently. The primary justification for this assumption is that it was suggested to decision
makers by the instructions. Second, given that there were 100 separate combinations of offer
components,6 decision makers accumulating evidence over combinations of components
would accumulate evidence for any given combination only very slowly. If decision makers
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Table 1. Activities by experimental session. All activities used the collections task.
Activity Description
Initial expectations Subjects completed 20 prediction drills in which they had to indicate within four seconds
whether the debtor would accept or reject a given offer by clicking on the graph in
figure 1. Offers were presented to subjects as yellow highlighting on each of the offer’s
component buttons. For instance, an offer to pay $100 in 2 days with negative education
was indicated by highlighting the $100, 2 days, and negative education buttons. Subjects
then had to click on the graph to indicate a prediction of accept or reject. Subjects received
no feedback regarding the correctness of their predictions.
Offers were constructed as follows. There were four offers for each of the dollar amounts
from $100 to $500. For each dollar amount, two of the offers contained positive education
and two negative education. Days and dollar amounts were correlated with offers of one
and two days grace coinciding with $100, two and three days grace with $200, etc.
Education statements were orthogonal to each of these other two bid components. The
order of presentation was randomized across subjects.
Prediction training Subjects completed 50 four second prediction drills in random order receiving feedback
about the correctness of their predictions depending on whether they were in the positive,
negative, or control prediction conditions. The predictions were performed exactly as
in the initial expectations task.
The fifty offers were constructed so that each of the possible even days (2, 4, 6, 8, 10)
was grouped with all of the dollar amounts and all of the education statements. Across
the fifty offers, all offer components were uncorrelated. Feedback consisted of a red
dot appearing in the place the subject should have clicked. In the positive condition,
positive education caused a red dot to appear on accept and negative education caused a
red dot to appear on reject. The negative education condition produced dots in the exact
opposite pattern. The control condition responded according to the negative condition
one-half the time and the positive condition one-half the time so that neither positive
nor negative education was favored.
Bargaining Subjects completed fifty randomized four-second rounds of bargaining in which they spec-
ified all components of their offers to debtors by clicking on the buttons they chose
for dollars, days, and education. Debtors responded favorably to positive education and
negatively to negative education using the decision rule in Eq. (3). Subjects were told to
get the best deals they could because their (fictitious) boss would give them a (fictional)
prize if they did the best.
Factual questions Subjects were asked to select the offer element (dollars, days, and education) that had the
most influence on debtors’ decisions to accept or reject their offers.
considered components independently, then when considering what to do for education,
they would only accumulate evidence over two options. Were decision makers to somehow
use a combination of the two representations, the simpler representation where compo-
nents were considered independently would accumulate evidence more rapidly and thereby
dominate. Thus, the simulations were simplified to only considering how decision makers
accumulated evidence for the education component of each offer, the part that mattered
most for the offer being accepted in this task. This assumption is examined below in an
analysis of subjects’ responses to the factual questions.
The second assumption was how to set α1 and α2, the size given to evidence weight
updates, rt , in the long-memory and short-memory models respectively. In the case of α1,
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a simple approach was to assume that the responses to the 20 initial expectations questions
represented the subjects’ initial evidence weights and that subjects updated these weights
by adding one to the evidence weights of successful options as they bargain (Fudenberg
and Levine, 1998, p. 31). To give initial evidence the same weight at the start of learning
with short-memory models, α2 was set so that each weight update would be one-twentieth
the total accumulated evidence weight to that point in the experiment.
Results
The evolution of subjects’ belief by condition that positive education would produce an
accept and negative education a reject (the positive hypothesis) was of interest in the pre-
diction task. Counts of subjects’ predictions congruent with this hypothesis were summed
over groups of ten contacts, producing five data points for each subject from start to finish
of the task. For the long-memory and short-memory simulation models, predictions were
generated by using Eq. (1) to estimate the model’s average propensity to make predic-
tions congruent with the positive hypothesis based on the evidence accumulated up to the
mid-point of that group of 10. These estimates were then rounded to the nearest whole
number.
Figure 2 compares the predictions of the long-memory and short-memory S-R models
with subjects’ performance. Both the long-memory and short-memory models predicted
Figure 2. By prediction condition (control, negative; positive), a comparison between subjects, short-memory
models and long-memory models of the number of predictions congruent with the belief that positive education
leads to compliance.
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Table 2. By prediction condition, difference () between number of model and
subject predictions congruent with the belief that positive education is effective.
Short-memory Long-memory
 t15 p  t15 p
Control −2.5 −2.01 0.06 −1.5 −1.21 0.25
Positive 2 1.02 0.32 5.88 3.00 0.01
Negative −1.75 −0.94 0.36 −4.5 −2.41 0.03
that subjects in the positive condition would increase their predictions congruent with the
positive hypothesis, would decrease these predictions in the negative condition and evolve
toward making predictions congruent with the positive hypothesis 50% of the time in the
control condition.
Subject data confirmed both the long-memory and short-memory models’ predictions
concerning the direction of the effects. Across the prediction task, subjects in the positive
condition made significantly more predictions congruent with the positive hypothesis than
subjects in the control and negative conditions (t45 = 13.48, p < 0.001), and subjects in the
negative condition made significantly less than those in the control condition (t45 = −6.56,
p < 0.001). Similarly to both models, subjects in the control condition showed a modest but
significant linear increase toward 50% in the number of predictions congruent with the pos-
itive hypothesis (t45 = 3.23, p < 0.01). Subjects in the negative condition showed a signifi-
cant decrease relative to controls (t45 = −2.37, p < 0.05), and those in the positive condition
an increase relative to controls and negative condition subjects (t45 = 7.86, p < 0.001).
Table 2 shows that while both long and short-memory models provided good fits to
the number of subject predictions congruent with the belief that positive education was
effective, the short-memory model’s fits tended to be closer. The short-memory model’s
prediction was only marginally different from control subjects and insignficantly different
for subjects in positive and negative prediction training. By counter, the long-memory model
was significantly different from subjects for positive and negative prediction training.
Figure 3 compares subjects’ use of positive education with that predicted by both models
in the bargaining task. As in prediction training, subjects made 50 offers that were grouped by
tens for analysis. The long-memory model predicted that subjects in the positive prediction
condition would almost entirely use positive education, those in the negative prediction
condition would initially use almost no positive education, increasing their use to a little
under half the time by the end of the task, and those in the control prediction condition
would use positive education about half the time at the start of the task increasing to eight
out of ten by the end of the task. It also predicted that the change in performance from
start to finish of the task would be highest for subjects in the negative prediction condition,
next highest for controls, and lowest for subjects in the positive prediction condition. As
further apparent in figure 3, the short-memory models agreed with both the initial deficits
predicted by the long-memory model and the ordering in subjects improvement. However,
it predicted much higher final performance for negative and control conditions.
As apparent in figure 3, human subjects results agreed with the initial performance
difference and the order of performance improvement that both models predicted between
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Figure 3. By prediction condition (control, negative; positive), a comparison between subjects, short-memory
models and long-memory models of the number of the number of positive education statements used.
conditions. At the start of the bargaining task, subjects who had been in the negative predic-
tion condition used significantly less positive education than control subjects (t45 = −2.79,
p < 0.01), and positive condition subjects used significantly more positive education than
both control and negative condition subjects (t45 = 5.95, p < 0.001). Negative condition
subjects showed greater performance improvement during the task than control condition
subjects, although the difference did not attain significance in a two-tailed test (t45 = 1.51,
p < 0.13). Both control and negative condition subjects showed greater improvement during
the task than positive prediction condition subjects (t45 = −2.59, p < 0.05).
Table 3 shows the short and long-memory models’ fits to subject data. The short-
memory model provides substantially better fits than the long-memory model. Overall,
Table 3. By prediction condition, difference () between number of model
and subject offers using positive education.
Short-memory Long-memory
 t15 p  t15 p
Control 2.31 0.84 0.42 10.125 3.66 0.01
Positive 1.44 1.01 0.33 4.5 3.16 0.01
Negative 7.44 2.49 0.025 20.13 6.73 0.001
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its performance was not significantly different from that of human subjects in the control
and positive conditions while the long-memory model’s performance was always signfi-
cantly different from that of subjects. Although, the short-memory model’s performance
was significantly different from that of subjects overall in the negative condition, by the
end of bargaining, it converged to subject performance. The long-memory model did not
converge to subject performance.
A chief assumption in the simulation models was that subjects were aware of the separate
component actions and could accumulate evidence for them separately. Subjects’ answers
to the question of which was the most influential element in getting debtors to pay provided
indirect confirmation of this assumption. In the positive and negative conditions, a larger
proportion of subjects than chance indicating that education was the most influential element
in convincing debtors would show that these subjects understood the component role edu-
cation played in the prediction and bargaining tasks. Seven-eighths of the subjects in both
these conditions indicated education as the most influential element vs. seven-sixteenths
in the control condition, a highly significant difference (χ22 = 10.34, p < 0.01). Thus, at
least for subjects in the positive and negative prediction conditions, there is strong evidence
that decision makers were aware of the effects of the separate component actions in the
task.
Discussion
This experiment tested the S-R model based hypothesis that how subjects learned to predict
a debtor’s responses would influence how they behaved in subsequent bargaining. It also
compared the predictions of two S-R formulations, long-memory and short-memory. Both
formulations successfully predicted the direction in which subjects’ performance would
evolve during prediction training. However, the short-memory model provided substantially
better fits, never significantly differing from subject performance, while the long-memory
model was significantly different in the positive and negative training conditions.
In bargaining, subjects dealt with bargainers who conformed with their previous predic-
tion training (positive) or who contradicted that training to various degrees (control and
negative). Again, both models predicted the direction of effects. Subjects in the negative
prediction condition performed worse in the bargaining task (used less positive education)
than subjects in the control condition, and subjects in the positive prediction condition
outperformed both.
Only the short-memory model predicted the degree of subjects’ adaptation in the control
and negative training conditions. Long-memory model performance was always signifi-
cantly different from that of subjects. The short-memory model was at least more than two
times closer to subject performance in all conditions and only differed signficantly from
subjects in the negative condition. Even in the negative prediction condition, short-memory
model performance converged to that of subjects.
An alternative model that relied on subjects ignoring their experience from the prediction
task would not have predicted the differences at the start of bargaining that did exist for
subjects. A component of performance in this type of dynamic task is that decision makers
are able to quickly learn to ignore irrelevant past experience based on changed feedback
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to their actions alone. Subjects are nonetheless affected by this experience, at least in the
early stages of learning. Thus, the design of this experiment, where decision makers had
to quickly adapt to changing response tendencies, provided a good basis for distinguishing
between multiple model candidates.
An important assumption underlying both short-memory and long-memory models was
that subjects were aware of the separate effects of the component parts of the offer. Subjects
in the positive and negative prediction conditions showed evidence that they were aware
of the education component’s separate effect because they were able to recognize it as the
most influential element in getting their offers accepted.
Experiment 2: Decision Experience’s Influence on Prediction
In Experiment 1, the prediction training was structured so that subjects saw each of twenty-
five offers with both positive and negative education. Thus, prediction training provided
both feedback and systematic exploration of the task environment. This exploration might
have given subjects a hint about how to perform when they came to the bargaining task,
over and above any prediction skills they learned.
A chief feature of S-R learning is that both prediction and choice depend on decision
makers’ anticipation of the success of any action given Eq. (1). Therefore, Experiment 2
tested whether bargaining experience influenced subsequent prediction, providing evidence
of this link.
Task and Method
Experiment 2 used the same bargaining task as Experiment 1. Subjects started with the
initial conditions task and then moved directly to bargaining. They then repeated the initial
conditions task (i.e., performed a post-learning prediction test) and answered the factual
questions. Subjects were in one of two conditions. In positive training, subjects bargained
in a task where positive education was effective per Eq. (3) and those in negative training
bargained in a task where negative education was effective. Thus, subjects received feedback
in the task without being pushed to the same systematic exploration of task structure as in
Experiment 1. Forty-three paid University of Michigan Business School undergraduates
participated in this study.
Results and Discussion
Figure 4 shows subjects performance in the negative and positive training conditions. As is
apparent in the figure, subjects in positive training used significantly more positive educa-
tion than subjects in negative training (t41 = 7.32, p < 0.001). Further, the subjects in each
condition showed opposite trends in their use of education (t41 = 4.6, p < 0.001).
The bargaining conditions also affected subjects’ prediction in the post-learning test.
Subjects in the positive bargaining condition showed a significantly higher tendency to
predict that positive education would produce an accept and negative education a reject
(t41 = 8.42, p < 0.001).
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Figure 4. By bargaining condition (negative or positive), the number of positive education statements subjects
used.
Finally, the positive bargaining condition allowed an additional, indirect assessment of
whether subjects’ participation in the control prediction training in Experiment 1 affected
their subsequent bargaining performance. One possibility is that these Experiment 1 subject
would significantly differ from positive bargaining subjects in Experiment 2 because they
were pushed by the prediction corpus to more systematically explore the debtor’s response
tendencies. Comparing figures 3 and 4, subjects’ performance in the positive training con-
dition closely matched that of subjects from the control condition in Experiment 1 and was
insignificantly different from it. Thus, the totality of results from this experiment suggest
that the only effect prediction training had on subjects’ performance in Experiment 1 was
to reinforce the relevant response tendencies.
General Discussion
This study tested the predictions made by two S-R learning models, long-memory and
short-memory, for how decision makers would adapt to response shifts in a very simple
repeated decision environment. Experiment 1 confirmed that both models provided an
adequate account of how decision makers learned to predict the debtors’ responses in a
preliminary prediction task, thereby confirming that S-R models may account for how
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decision makers anticipate effects. Experiment 1 also confirmed both models’ predictions
that decision makers in different prediction conditions would show different initial offer
tendencies in a subsequent bargaining task as well as different rates of adaptation. However,
only the short-memory model came near predicting the final level of adaptation decision
makers showed when switching from predicting debtors’ behavior under one response rule
to bargaining with debtors who responded based on an opposite response rule.
An alternative explanation is that the structure of the prediction task gave subjects a
strong hint about task structure and that subsequent behavior was not strongly tied to ability
to predict. Experiment 2 demonstrated that unstructured bargaining experience influenced
subjects’ subsequent prediction performance, thereby more firmly establishing the link
embedded in the structure of S-R models.
Implications
The models examined here have been proposed principally as explanations for behavior
in stable environments that do not alter their response tendencies over time (e.g., Erev
and Roth, 1998; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Roth and Erev, 1995). By examining the
performance of these models and human decision makers in a very simple but unstable
environment, this study asked to what degree decision makers conform to the type of belief
updating usually assumed as the core mechanism in S-R models. The superiority of the
short-memory S-R model in predicting the adaptation of decision makers who experienced
opposite response functions in the prediction and bargaining tasks amplifies previous results
where an additional parameter for forgetting provided marginal improvement in the models’
fits to decision maker performance (e.g., Roth and Erev, 1995).
As is readily apparent from an examination of Eq. (2), the standard assumptions of S-R
models predict that decision makers will be slow to react when the response tendencies of
an environment are subject to change. The modeling and human subject results reported for
Experiment 1 provided a case in point that this assumption may not apply to a broad class
of decision environments where decision makers must adapt on the fly, even if the only
basis for adaptation is outcome feedback from their decisions. A model identical in form,
but where the influence of past experience quickly fades, provides a better account.
Limitations and Qualifications
The work reported here has two important limitations. First, the task is very simple. Decision
makers in functioning environments typically face tasks in which they take weeks or months
to gain competency (Gibson and Fichman, 1998; Joslyn and Hunt, 1998; Kanfer and
Ackerman, 1989; Klein et al., 1993). However, in spite of its simplicity, the task captures the
important role of education in the functioning environment, leading to the possibility that
its results may generalize back to that environment. Furthermore, the task ties to a broader
class of bargaining task that has been well-studied (Roth and Erev, 1995; Fudenberg and
Levine, 1998; Raiffa, 1982), potentially making the results more generalizable.
Second, the modeling approach is very frugal, focusing only on one discrete memory
representation for possible actions and one evidence accumulation mechanism. There is
general agreement that the brain contains more than one memory and evidence accumulation
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mechanisms (e.g., Anderson, 1993; LeDoux, 1996; McClelland et al., 1995). However, S-R
models share their assumption of discrete memory representations with theories of cognitive
learning in economic games (e.g., Erev and Roth, 1998; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998),
animal learning (e.g., Barto et al., 1989), specific event learning in the hippocampus (e.g.,
McClelland et al., 1995), and judgments of probability in MINERVA-DM (Dougherty et al.,
1999). In all of these models, it is the weight of evidence provided by specific memories
that drives behavior. Therefore, the reductionist approach used here speaks to a feature that
is common to many models and examines its ability to provide an account of behavior in
dynamic tasks.
Conclusion
This paper has presented a model which predicts that decision makers who forget will
outperform those who do not in unstable environments. Empirical results with human
subjects confirmed the prediction in one simple, unstable decision environment. The degree
to which these results and models can be extended to other, more complex and naturalistic
environments is the topic of future research.
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Notes
1. Many game theorists examining learning assume stable environments, particularly when they want to understand
when learning leads to long-run normative behavior (Ido Erev and Colin Camerer, personal communications).
Recently, theorists have begun to formally explore organization-level adaptation in dynamic environments
(Carley and Lee, 1998; Levinthal, 1997). The important question of individual adaptation to change after a
period of learning, as explored in this paper, remains open.
2. This assumption is usually implemented as a decrease to the weight of the chosen option if it fails. The
implementation here avoids the inconvenience of possibly negative weights.
3. This figure is derived from observations within an actual call center where collectors contacted debtors by
telephone (Gibson et al., 1996).
4. In the instructions, the two education statements are indicated as meant to convey either positive or negative
education.
5. In experiments, the orders of all choice options are counterbalanced.
6. Calculated as 10 possible days by 5 possible dollar amounts by two types of education.
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